In some post which seems to have disappeared from my spool, there were some comments about how the prison system treats women (murderers in particular). Here is some data on the topic. It's slightly out of date (1986) - the big problem was getting prison composition data. (Unfortunately, this has been changing, so the out-of-datedness could well change the figures. It's the most recent data I could find though - getting prison composition data is the problem here.)

The data reports the criminal population (only for single-offender crimes, alas) as reported _by the victims_ in the National Crime Survey. It also reports the prison composition by gender for each crime category for comparison. Murder data for perps is from the Uniform Crime Reports as the NCS doesn't collect this data (the difficulty in getting interviews from dead victims is one reason :-)). The data for the NCS is from the year 1988.

The conclusion, in a generic sense, which follows is that women are underrepresented in prison for a broad spectrum of violent crimes, including murder.

Murder is a particularly tricky issue. It's hard to tell how much to trust police reports. I think that the bias of the justice system as a whole is best addressed by looking at other crimes where data by the victim is available, and assuming similar biases apply to murder. YMMV - but there seems to be no objective way to determine the true facts in a murder case.

Some relevant information - it is claimed (I don't have the stats) that on the overall women serve more prison time (for murder) - when they are convicted. This difference appears to go away when one looks at comparable crimes (1st degree or 2nd degree murder), or even reverse. (Farrell reports that it reverses for at least 2nd degree murders in "Myth of Male Power", but I haven't looked at this statistic enough to be sure how much I can trust it - Farrell is not the most reliable source, unfortunately.) It appears that women are more likely to premeditate - the example that always comes to my mind is "The Burning Bed" case. Unfortunately I don't have the documentation to address this issue as fully as I would like. What I _can_ document is that female murderers are not overrepresented in the prison population as a whole, at least as of 1986.

I looked at a few of lizkates references.

lizkates posted dozens of references with no explanation of what they were, claiming in effect, that they all support everything she says.

Some support the opposite of what lizkates says, some are so ludicrous that to show women as victims they make the stretch that to correct a bias against men is to hurt women. Women are victims when they don't get special treatment (See the fourth reference below).

( Continued next page )

( Continued )

The first reference of lizkates that I looked up is pretty balanced. I don't know how lizkates thinks that this study supports her claim that the courts are not biased against men. The report says the opposite is true in some kinds of law, for example it says

• Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 8 Ga. St. L. Rev. 539 (1992)
• _Sexual Offenses_ OCGA SS 16-6-1 (a) A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.

The report recommends that the law be changed to include in its definition of rape the case where the male is the victim.

• _Sentencing_ The report says that men, more than women, are 8% more likely to be incarcerated rather than given probation. And when incarcerated, men are likely to get a longer sentence by 18 months on average.

The second reference of lizkates that I found is riddled with bias. It appears that this one is where the 70% success rate of fathers seeking custody comes from. The way it gets 70% success is to lump joint physical custody with primary physical custody, and call them both a success. This reference is ostensibly a gender neutral report intending to expose gender bias both ways, but it bends over backwards to deny any bias against men in any category. Here are a couple of snippets from this

• Report of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Gender Bias Study Committee, 24 New England L. Rev. 745 (l990)
• "Women are disproportionately affected by crimes of violence involving nonstrangers..." p.750
• Fathers who actively seek custody (8.75% of fathers) obtain either primary or joint physical custody over 70% of the time. ... Primary physical custody 29% of the time. Joint physical custody 65% of the time.

The violence statistic sounds like the Innumeracy propagated here by Kate Orman. The broken down custody numbers don't add to 70% (the quoted total), but that doesn't appear to bother the authors. The 70% figure is the upfront figure in the summary, with the spin that that is how often fathers "succeed", and the note that this is contrary to popular opinion. No mention that success for the father is defined as anytime the mother doesn't win primary physical custody. Joint custody is defined as fathers winning.

The third reference of lizkates that I looked up is extreme.

• Martha A. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 Mich. L. Rev. p.1 (l991)

It starts by claiming saying that some researchers put violence by men against women at about equal to that of women against men, but that the author believes other researchers who say men are much more often the batterers. It quotes some researchers who claim 50% of women are battered in their marriages, and some who claim 60%, and states that the author believes the 50% number.

On the battered woman's defense for murder it says (p.36) "When a woman is tried for killing her abuser she encounters ... the problem of the jury's inability to understand her experience".

The author sees no discrepancy between her statement that 50% of women suffer abuse from their husbands and the statement that you can't find a jury member to understand the abuse and acquit.

I don't know whether to laugh or cry over what is in the fourth reference of lizkates that I looked up.

• Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Final Report 1993 I read the part which is about unequal treatment of criminals. It says that the Guidelines for sentencing and the mandatory minimum sentences are unfair to women because the effects of equal treatment disproportionately hurts women as a class since before the guidelines they used to get off with lessor sentences. They explain this in the footnote as to why Guidelines hurt women disproportionately.
• p.181 "... Thus, if women received lessor sentences prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, and now their sentences more closely approximate those given to men, the Guidelines would have had a disproportionately harsher effect on women than men."

[T]here is a case to make about bias against men in the courts, and that the courts formed gender bias commissions says that they are interested.

However, most of these commissions' (most that I read) wrote reports that bend over backwards to deny that there is any bias against men.

Some of these commissions admit bias against men (Georgia and Texas), but others are so extremely myopic, that in there zeal to paint everything as a bias against women, they make the stretch that to correct a bias against men is to hurt women. Women are victims when they don't get special treatment.

The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Final Report 1993 says that the Guidelines for sentencing and the mandatory minimum sentences are unfair to women because the effects of equal treatment disproportionately hurts women as a class since before the guidelines they used to get off with lessor sentences. They explain this in the footnote as to why Guidelines hurt women disproportionately.

The Massachusetts commission sought to find that the courts are biased against women in custody awards. It appears that this one is where the 70% success rate of fathers seeking custody comes from. The way it gets 70% success is to lump joint physical custody with primary physical custody, and call them both a success.

This reference is ostensibly a gender neutral report intending to expose gender bias both ways, but it bends over backwards to deny any bias against men in any category. Here are a couple of snippets from this

The violence statistic comes from using a different denominator in calculating percentage of victims of violence. Its use indicates that the authors are either innumerate, or intentionally trying to skew the report.

The broken down custody numbers don't add to 70% (the quoted total), but that doesn't appear to bother the authors. The 70% figure is the upfront figure in the summary, with the spin that that is how often fathers "succeed", and the note that this is contrary to popular opinion. No mention that success for the father is defined as anytime the mother doesn't win primary physical custody. Joint custody is defined as fathers winning.

-Ted

Well I went to court yesterday on my motion of having my alimony payments to my ex-wife terminated. While I believe I was successful (I only have to pay her alimony for another 6 months and she has to pick up and pay for dental insurance for our daughters both of whom I have sole custody of...) she still is under no court order to pay child support. However it was made clear to me that I would be able to seek this from her in the future if I so desire...

Anyway, what I'm really writing about is the observations I made while sitting for 4 hours in court yesterday on the way me are treated. There was one man who was behind in his support payments because he had been out of work and his new wife had just given birth two weeks ago to a baby. The judge was very strict with him and gave him a 2 month window pay up to his first wife or else he would be incarcerated. The judge (a woman) berated him for a long time about not living up to his responsibilities. All the while I kept thinking that why isn't my X wife receiving the same kind of treatment as this man was from the system for not supporting her children, but instead is receiving money from ME for her to live on...

There was another young man brought in in handcuffs who had apparently assaulted his wife when he found her with another man. The wife was give a restraining order against her husband and he was told that he could have no contact with his children for a two month period. When the wife said she had no problem with the husband seeing and having their child the judge came down hard on her telling her that her job was to protect "her child" from her father and to let the child know that daddy's behavior was unacceptable and that he would be getting help. It was obvious to me that the guy was extremely upset about not being able to see or be with his children for the next two months...

On another case a NCP man brought contempt charges against his ex wife for moving their children out of state against a court order and didn't allow him to see them for three months... the judge threw the contempt charge out immediately because the woman had moved back to Mass. recently with the children and she said she "Didn't want to deal with it." Instead she asked the man if he was up-to-date on his support payments and wanted to know what the sleeping arrangements for the children would be if she allowed them to visit him now (a right I presume he already had under his divorce order). Once he convinced her that he would only have them during the days and not the evenings on the weekends she consented to let him see his kids again...AFTER she asked the wife if it was ok with HER for the father to start seeing his children again...

There were several other cases like these as well. It was SO disturbing to watch this institutionalized discrimination taking place. On many occasions I wanted to stand up and say "How come you treat the women with kid gloves and treat the men like shit?"...

I must say, I feel really blessed in having custody of my children after again witnessing the bias in the system.

In a society conditioned to believe that women are the only victims of bias, the idea that men frequently are as well may come as quite a shock. We're all keenly aware of the pervasive discrimination that exists against women and minorities in the workplace and in many other ares of their lives. But, when we turn our attention to the criminal justice system, it's obvious that there is an equally shocking level of bias. This time, however, men are the unquestioned victims.

On average, American men commit a disproportionate number of most types of felony crimes. It's not surprising then, that seven times more men are arrested than women. What is surprising, however, is that after all these accused criminals have had trials, nineteen men are imprisoned for every woman.

For burglary, while nine men are arrested for every woman, thirty are imprisoned for every woman. For aggravated assault, 10 men are arrested for every woman, but seventy-nine times more men are incarcerated. Even when it comes to white-collar crimes such as fraud -- where more women than men are arrested -- nine men are jailed for every woman.

Some who attempt to explain away men's disproportional likelihood to wind up in jail claim that the "real" problem is racism -- that the percentage of African-American men processed by the criminal justice system is so high that it skews the figures. While few would dispute that racism in the courts is rampant, that alone is not enough. Five African-Americans are arrested -- and six are jailed -- for every Caucasian. That's a difference of about 20 percent. For men and women, however, the difference is closer to 70 percent.

The increased likelihood of doing time isn't all men have to worry about. On average, men receive prison sentences that are 40 percent longer than those of women convicted of the SAME crime, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. One might argue that men's longer prison terms are the result of the severity of their crimes and their longer criminal records.

But studies that control for these factors prove otherwise. "Women and men with comparable backgrounds do not receive comparable sentence lengths for felony crimes," write researchers Mathew Zingraff and Randall Thomson in "THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW." "Women are given shorter sentence lengths." Overall, Zingraff and Thomson found that gender contributed more to the determination of sentence length than any other variable they investigated. These findings were confirmed in a recent Los Angeles Times article quoting Department of Justice sources which reported that women convicted of killing their husbands receive an average sentence of only six years, while male spousal killers got 17 years.

So why is there such strong anti-male bias in the courts? Gender bias researchers Jon Ryan and Ian Wilson, suggest that the answer is based on three ancient stereotypes.

First, women are born more innocent than men (so judges -- who are predominantly male -- see women as less capable of committing criminal acts);

Second, women are more reformable than men (and thus less punishment is necessary to straighten them out);

Third, women are less dangerous than men (and are therefore less of a threat to society).

For more than 20 years, women have complained about similar stereotypes that have been used to keep them out of the board room, the Senate, and even combat. They rightfully resent being treated as children who don't know how to take care of themselves. But when it comes to taking responsibility for their behavior, women seem perfectly content to allow law enforcement officials and judges to gallantly rescue damsels in distress.

Unfortunately, such well-intentioned chivalry usually turns out to be nothing more than paternalism that demeans and oppresses the very people it seeks to protect.

As women have struggled for equality, feminists of both sexes have fought to break down all types of gender-based discrimination and have demanded that women be treated the same way men are. In some areas, that's a goal we should all be striving for. But in the case of our criminal justice system, it's time we started treating men the same way we treat women.

What has lesbian violence got to do with mens issues? Well, the topic comes up a lot when discussing whether or not its plausible that women frequently batter men.

"Great Reading on Men and Masculinities"

Like any authoritarians, the politically correct must first deny their own authoritarianism. Thus, after 10 years of speech-codes; of people being drummed out of jobs for deviating from a strict but continuously varying lexicon of 'correct' words and phrases, like 'African-American', which superceded 'black', which superceded 'colored', which superceded 'negro'; of the stifling of any dissent from the canonical multiculturalist worldview in American Universities, people like Steiner still try to pretend that political correctness doesn't exist.

Of course it exists.

Whether this is your first journey into the California Family Law system, or you have been here before, there are certain things which you should be aware of at the outset; an understanding of these things will help to make your life just a little bit easier.

1. Your Attorney is More Than Just Your Lawyer: While it is true that your attorney's primary job is to ensure that your rights are protected, in the Family Law arena your attorney can and should be much more for you. Just as going on a safari into the unknown wilds of the deepest jungle requires a knowledgeable guide, so does navigating the Family Court System. Your attorney is your guide to a journey which, to the uninitiated and unaware, is fraught with pitfalls. Not only can your attorney provide you with a map of the terrain, but they can advise you as to the safest route, and the regions to avoid.

This is particularly important for fathers, who walk into the Family Law System with the deck already wildly stacked against them; having someone by your side who knows what you are up against, and what both the limitations and possibilities for fathers are in that context, as well as how best to achieve the full potential of those possibilities, will be your greatest strength.

2. You and Your Child's Mother Will Have to Co-Parent Until Your Children Turn Eighteen: Regardless of how well or not you and your child's mother get along, the fact remains that you will be co- parenting your child or children at least until they turn eighteen. For this reason, it is to everyone's advantage, particularly your children's, for the two of you to get to a point as soon as possible where you can communicate civilly and reasonably.

This is another area where your attorney can be more than just your lawyer because your attorney can take the brunt of the heat for you, rather than you and your child's mother arguing over every little thing, which gets in the way of building a post-breakup co- parenting relationship.

3. You are Your Child's Father, not a Visitor: For too long the Family Law System has used the term "visitation" to refer to that time which a non-custodial parent shares with their child. Please never use that term. Instead, use a term such as "timeshare". Choice of language is a powerful tool, and it can make a difference. For example, the January 1, 1994 Santa Clara Family Court Local Rules now use the term "timeshare" instead of "visitation".

4. It All Starts at Family Court Services: Whether this is the first time you will be facing the issues of custody and timeshare, or you have already dealt with the initial arrangements and are now going back because one of you has requested a modification of the arrangements, you must go to mediation before you can go to court. This is the law throughout all counties in California.

California provides mediation through the vehicle known as Family Court Services ("FCS"). FCS is the mediating arm of the Family Law (Superior) Court System.

The parents will go to see an FCS mediator, and the mediator will "negotiate" a custody and/or timeshare agreement. The mediator will then make a recommendation to the Court, based on that "negotiated" arrangement. In many counties, if the recommendation is not objected to specifically, in writing, and within a certain number of days, the recommendation becomes a court order!

For the most part, mediators in FCS carry with them the same biases found elsewhere in the system, that is to say that the prevailing attitude is "mom gets the kids, dad pays." The default standard timeshare "negotiated" in FCS, or ordered by the Court, seems to be that the father has the children every other weekend, perhaps one evening during the week, and a few weeks in the summer, with traditional holidays alternated between mom and dad.

Fortunately, one does not have to go through FCS mediation if one can negotiate a custody and/or timeshare arrangement outside of the court system. It is almost always to a father's advantage to negotiate an agreement outside of the court system, and the fathers with the best arrangements are in large part those who have never set foot in FCS or (with regards to custody and timeshare) in court.

Negotiating such arrangements may seem like a daunting task to you, particularly if you and your children's mother are not able to communicate well, or without hostility. Fortunately, this is another area where your attorney is your best ally. To begin with, the actual negotiations will take place between your and her attorney, two people who both know the law (and thus what you are entitled to, and the working parameters) and who do not have to work in the emotionally-charged conditions which so many ex-couples find themselves operating under. Secondly, as mentioned above, by having the attorneys involved as the front-line negotiators, a lot of the heat is taken off you, freeing you up to, hopefully, begin to build a level of communication with your co-parent which will be to everyone's advantage, particularly you and your children's.

5. Understanding the "Other Side" and the Bottom Line: In the vast majority of cases involving children, the bottom line on the father's side is time with the children, while the bottom line on the mother's side is money. Do not hold this against your children's mother, as in large part this is not her fault. Women in our society, particularly women going through divorce, receive a very strong message about how men "owe" them for years of sex- based discrimination, for the choices they have made, as well as how women after divorce end up in poverty and therefore they must get as much money as possible from the man. Furthermore, the current family law system both encourages, and greatly empowers women to get as much money as possible. They constantly hear that refrain "mom gets the kids, dad pays". This plays out heavily in the issue of timeshare, because mothers in California know that the greater the level of timeshare the father has, the lower the amount of child support they receive will be. It is not that mothers put money above what is best for their children, it is that they have been indoctrinated to "know" that it is a foregone conclusion that it is best for the children to be with their mother, so that it is not even an issue. Mothers are also fully aware that the Court is not likely to change a current status quo timeshare and increase timeshare for the father, absent a truly compelling reason.

Knowing the perspective of the "other side", and what the bottom line is, can greatly help in terms of focusing on what is important, formulating strategy, and negotiating. For instance, many men who are in a position to do so have found, when looking to increase their timeshare, that it works well to offer to continue to pay the amount of child support dictated by the old, lower timeshare if the mother will agree to a new increased timeshare. By offering to do this, it completely removes the primary incentive for the mother to not agree to an increased timeshare for the father.

6. Always Be, or at Least Appear to Be, Reasonable: There are two very good reasons why you should always be as reasonable as you can possibly be: I) you are likely to get more of what is really important to you in negotiations, and II) if negotiations fail, it will likely be due to the other party's unreasonableness (after all, you are being as reasonable as possible). This will have bearing on how the court will view and decide your case if you must go to court ("Your honor, we are sorry to have to take up the Court's time, but as you can see, we have been so reasonable, and she has refused to be reasonable and negotiate."), and on how the Court will determine the issues of payment of attorneys' fees.

7. Certain Things Just Are:

There are certain things written in stone in California law. They just are - there is no way around them, and fighting them will only cost you a great deal both emotionally, and financially. Furthermore, fighting these issues in court will almost always backfire, because the Judge will get angry at you for "wasting" the court's time over something which is immutable. This can cost you both money, and the court's good will (read as, among other things, "timeshare").

• A. Wage Assignments: It is the law in California now that in all cases, a wage assignment (garnishment) order for support will be rendered by the court. Period. Your attorney may be able to negotiate with the other side so that the order is not actually served on your employer, and thus will not take effect, unless and until you are late with a support payment. If you have ever been even a day late, or a dollar short, the odds of this are slim.
• B. Child Support and "Add-Ons": In California, child support is considered to cover the basics: food, shelter, clothing, etc.. The court can, and often does, include several types of "add-ons", meaning things which you must pay in addition to child support. The most typical ones are the cost of child care, health insurance, and uninsured medical expenses. Where the mother is working, often the cost of child care and uninsured medical expenses are split between the parties.
• C. Attorneys Fees: California law specifically authorizes the court to order one party to pay another's attorneys fees. The two factors most often considered, in order of emphasis, are I) who earns more money, and II) which party, if any, has brought the case before the court unreasonably. The bottom line is that if you earn more than she does, if she makes a motion for attorneys fees, there is a good chance you will have to pay part or all of them, unless she has been extremely unreasonable while you have attempted in good faith, and very reasonably, to negotiate the issues.
• D. Her Activities and Lifestyle: California is a no-fault divorce state. This means that the Court is not supposed to consider, and simply does not care about, which party did or does what. Period. The only way your children's mother's activities are likely to have any impact at all on custody and/or timeshare is if they truly present an obvious danger to the child's health and welfare.
• E. Expenses: Both parties have to fill out an Income and Expense Declaration, listing not only their incomes, but what their monthly living expenses are. Many people are tempted to round out their expenses on this form. Many people look at the other party's listed expenses and get upset over the amount the other person claims to be spending. Guess what: it almost never matters. Except in exceptional cases, the Court doesn't care how much your car payment is, or that your child's mother is blowing $300.00 per month on ski lessons. But you still must fill out the expense section, and you never know but that your's may be an exceptional situation. Some circumstances which have been held to be exceptional include the cost of massive credit debt which the husband has assumed because of the divorce agreement, and the cost of special education for handicapped children. Furthermore, if you have children from a subsequent relationship which you are providing for, you may be able to slightly reduce your support obligation based on those expenses.

8. A Word About Counselling: Joint counselling with a partner or ex-partner can be very valuable. Often women seem to resist this idea because they feel the man is trying to get them into couples' or marriage counseling to try to influence them to resurrect the relationship.

There are two types of counselling which can be very helpful in this situation: pre-divorce counselling, and co-parent counselling. Both of these types of counselling, when explained properly, are often acceptable to a co-parent.

The purpose of pre-divorce counselling is to help a couple who knows they are going to divorce to dissipate some of the anger and hostility which may be between them, and to help them to build a better base of communication, so that they can make mature, informed, and rational decisions. After all, the decisions which they will make during the course of their divorce will have a profound effect on their children. Furthermore, they will have to continue to communicate in a co-parenting capacity for years to come.

Co-parent counselling is not unlike pre-divorce counselling, only it occurs typically after the initial arrangements have been put into place. Many co-parents find this sort of counselling invaluable as it gives them a place where it is ok and acceptable for them to communicate, for the sake of the children, without the outside influence of the children, second mates, family, and friends.

9. In Closing: Hopefully you have found this brief overview to be informative, and helpful. But remember, it is not legal advice: nothing substitutes for the relationship which you have, or will build, with your attorney.

Plea bargin.

"When Shane Seyer was twelve years old, he was sexually molested, repeatedly, over a period of several months, by his babysitter. Colleen Hermesmann, the babysitter, was initially charged with statutory rape ("indecent liberties with a child" in Kansas) but plea-bargained to a lesser charge -- "contributing to a child's misconduct."

When Colleen Hermesmann and her new baby went on welfare, the state did what it usually does in cases of single mothers seeking state assistance -- it tried to find the father, in this case young Shane Seyer, and to get him to pay child support.

In March, the Kansas state supreme court ruled that when Shane Seyer was molested by his babysitter at age 12, he consented to 18 years of child-support payments. "We conclude," the court wrote, "that the issue of consent to sexual activity under the criminal statutes is irrelevant in a civil action to determine paternity and for support of the minor child of such activity."

The court ruled that "[i]n an action by the State against a minor father for reimbursement of funds paid for support of his child, the fault or wrongdoing of the mother at the time of conception, even if criminal, has no bearing on the father's duty to support such child."

PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]

Appeal from Shawnee district court, JAMES P. BUCHELE, judge.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

SYLLABUS: SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. In an action for support of a minor child, the parents have a common-law, as well as a statutory, duty to support their minor child. This duty applies equally to parents of a child born out of wedlock.

2. In an action against a father for reimbursement to the State for support furnished under the aid to families with dependent children program, the fact that the father was under the age of 16 when the child was conceived and born and that the mother may have been guilty of violating K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503, or some other criminal statute, cannot serve to relieve the father of his legal responsibilities towards his child.

3. The issue of consent to sexual activity under the criminal statutes is irrelevant in a civil action to determine paternity and for support of a minor child born of such activity.

4. The State's interest in requiring minor parents to support their children is superior to the State's competing interest in protecting juveniles from their improvident acts, even when such acts may include criminal activity on the part of the other parent.

5. In an action [***2] by the State against a minor father for reimbursement of funds paid for support of his child, the fault or wrongdoing of the mother at the time of conception, even if criminal, has no bearing on the father's duty to support such child.

COUNSEL: Ronald P. Pope, of Eugene B. Ralston & Associates, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellants.

David N. Sutton, chief of litigation, Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

JUDGES: HOLMES

OPINIONBY: HOLMES

OPINION: [*647]

[**1274] The opinion of the court was delivered by

HOLMES, C.J.: Shane Seyer et al., appeal from an order of the district court granting the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) judgment for amounts paid for the birth and support of Seyer's daughter and ordering Seyer to pay monthly child support reimbursement to SRS. The facts, as best we can determine them from an inadequate record, do not appear to be seriously in dispute.

Colleen Hermesmann routinely provided care for Shane Seyer as a baby sitter or day care provider during 1987 and 1988. The two began a sexual relationship at a time when Colleen was 16 years old and Shane was only 12. The relationship [***3] continued over a period of several months and the parties engaged in sexual intercourse on an average of a couple of times a week. As a result, a daughter, Melanie, was born to Colleen on May 30, 1989. At the time of the conception of the child, Shane was 13 years old and Colleen was 17. Colleen applied for and received financial assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (ADC) from SRS.

On January 15, 1991, the district attorney's office of Shawnee County filed a petition requesting that Colleen Hermesmann be adjudicated as a juvenile offender for engaging in the act of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16, Shanandoah (Shane) Seyer, to whom she was not married, in violation of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503. Thereafter, Colleen Hermesmann entered into a plea agreement with the district attorney's office, wherein she agreed to stipulate to the lesser offense of contributing to a child's misconduct, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3612. On September 11, 1991, the juvenile court accepted the stipulation, and adjudicated Colleen Hermesmann to be a juvenile offender.

On March 8, 1991, SRS filed a petition on behalf of Colleen Hermesmann, alleging that [***4] Shane Seyer was the father of Colleen's minor daughter, Melanie. The petition also alleged that SRS had provided benefits through the ADC program to Colleen on behalf of the child and that Colleen had assigned support [*648] rights due herself and her child to SRS. The petition requested that the court determine paternity and [**1275] order Shane to reimburse SRS for all assistance expended by SRS on Melanie's behalf. On December 17, 1991, an administrative hearing officer found Shane was Melanie's biological father. The hearing officer further determined that Shane was not required to pay the birth expenses or any of the child support expenses up to the date of the hearing on December 17, 1991, but that Shane had a duty to support the child from the date of the hearing forward.

Shane requested judicial review of the decision of the hearing officer, contending that the hearing officer "should have found a failure of consent would terminate rights." SRS sought review, asserting that the hearing officer correctly ruled that the issue of consent was irrelevant, but erred in allowing Shane to present evidence pertaining to the defense of consent. SRS also alleged that the hearing officer's denial [***5] of reimbursement to the State for funds already paid was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the mandates of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 39-718b.

The district judge, upon judicial review of the hearing officer's order, determined that Shane was the father of Melanie Hermesmann and owed a duty to support his child, stating:

"Okay. I'm ready to rule. It's my view in this case that the Hearing Officer's ruling, which essentially is that a minor may be held legally liable to provide reimbursement to the State of Kansas under K.S.A. 39-701 et seq., is a correct ruling of law and that the issues of consent and the criminal case and so forth are not really relevant in a paternity proceeding, which we're talking about, civil liability to support a child.

"Second, I'm going to hold that the State, by proceeding under 39-701 et seq., that there is no discretion in the Court regarding liability. The courts, I believe, are ministerial at that point and are the vehicle for SRS to collect the support and it was error for the Hearing Officer not to assess all of the monies paid jointly and severally liable against both of the parents of this child.

"And so I would enter a judgment for [***6] all of the SRS reimbursement against Colleen Hermesmann and Shane Seyer jointly and severally for the six thousand plus."

The court found that the issue of Shane's consent was irrelevant and ordered Shane to pay child support of $ 50 per month. The court also granted SRS a joint and several judgment against Shane and Colleen in the amount of $ 7,068, for assistance provided by [*649] the ADC program on behalf of Melanie through February 1992. The judgment included medical and other birthing expenses as well as assistance paid after Melanie's birth. Shane appeals the judgment rendered and the order for continuing support but does not contest the trial court's paternity finding. SRS has not cross-appealed from any of the orders or judgment of the district court.

This case was transferred from the Court of Appeals by this court's own motion. K.S.A. 20-3018(c).

Shane has designated three issues on appeal, which he states as follows:

"I. Can a minor, who is a victim of the crime of indecent liberties with a child, be responsible for any children conceived of the criminal union?

"II. Is it sound public policy for a court to order child support when the order creates a clash of one [***7] minor's right to protection from being the victim of a crime with another minor's right to parental support?

"III. Can a judgment ordering joint and several liability for child support be an adequate remedy when it fails to account for the wrongdoing of Plaintiff-appellee Hermesmann?"

Shane's argument on appeal is based on three basic premises. (1) Shane Seyer, as a minor under the age of 16, was unable to consent to sexual intercourse. (2) Because he was unable to consent to sexual intercourse, he cannot be held responsible for the birth of his child. (3) Because he cannot be held responsible for the birth, he cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the child's support.

[**1276] Shane asserts as his first issue that, because he was a minor under the age of 16 at the time of conception, he was legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse and therefore cannot be held legally responsible for the birth of his child. Shane cites no case law to directly support this proposition. Instead, he argues that Colleen Hermesmann sexually assaulted him, that he was the victim of the crime of statutory rape, and that the criminal statute of indecent liberties with a child should [***8] be applied to hold him incapable of consenting to the act.

What used to be commonly called "statutory rape" is now included in the statutory crime of indecent liberties with a child. The statute, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503, reads in pertinent part:

"(1) Indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any of the following acts with a child who is under 16 years of age:

[*650] (a) Sexual intercourse."

Both the administrative hearing officer and the district court determined that whether Shane consented to sexual intercourse was not a relevant issue in a civil paternity and child support proceeding.

SRS maintains that Shane was not the victim of the crime of statutory rape. SRS points out that while Colleen was originally charged in juvenile proceedings with a violation of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503, she later stipulated to a lesser charge of contributing to a child's misconduct, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3612. While SRS is technically correct in asserting that Colleen was never found guilty of violating 21-3503, its entire case is based upon the fact that Shane is the father of the child. As it is undisputed that Shane was under the age of 16 when conception occurred, and throughout the [***9] entire time the sexual relationship continued, the argument of SRS is specious at best. The admitted facts established, without doubt, all of the elements necessary to prove a crime under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503(1)(a), and the fact that Colleen was able to plea bargain for a lesser offense does not preclude Shane from alleging he was a "victim" of statutory rape.

Although the issue of whether an underage alleged "victim" of a sex crime can be held liable for support of a child born as a result of such crime is one of first impression in Kansas, other jurisdictions have addressed the question.

In <=1> In re Paternity of J.L.H., 149 Wis. 2d 349, 441 N.W.2d 273 (1989), J.J.G. appealed from a summary judgment in a paternity proceeding determining that he was the father of J.L.H. and ordering him to pay child support equal to 17 percent of his gross income. J.J.G. was 15 years old when the child was conceived. On appeal, he asserted that the child's mother, L.H., sexually assaulted him, contrary to Wis. Stat. @ 940.225(2)(e) (1979) (the Wisconsin statutory rape statute in effect at the time), and that, as a minor, he was incapable of consent [***10] under the sexual assault law. The court rejected this argument and stated:

"The assumption underlying appellant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment is that a putative father in a paternity action has a defense if the sexual intercourse occurred without his consent. The amended civil complaint which his opposing affidavit incorporates alleges that the child born to L.H. was 'the result of nonconsensual sexual assault in violation of [*651] sec. 940.225(2)(e), Wis. Stats.' . . . . That statute provides that it is a felony for a person to have 'sexual intercourse with a person who is over the age of 12 years and under the age of 18 years without consent of that person, as consent is defined in sub. (4).' Subsection (4) provides:

'Consent' as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. A person under 15 years of age is incapable of consent as a matter of law. The following persons are presumed incapable of consent but the presumption may be [**1277] rebutted by competent evidence, subject to the provisions of s. 972.11(2):

(a) a person [***11] who is 15 to 17 years of age . . . ." . . . .

"We reject appellant's assertion that because he was fifteen years old when he had intercourse with L.H., he was incapable of consent. The assertion rests on the argument that sec. 940.225(4)(a), Stats. 1979, created a rebuttable presumption to that effect. That statute pertains to the guilt of a criminal defendant, not to the civil rights or duties of the victim. Paternity actions are civil proceedings. <=2> State ex rel. Lyons v. DeValk, 47 Wis.2d 200, 203, 177 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1970). The presumption created by sec. 940.225(4) (a) does not apply in this proceeding." <=3> 149 Wis. 2d at 355-57.

The court then goes on to state:

"If voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. This is true even if a fifteen-year old boy's parenthood resulted from a sexual assault upon him within the meaning of the criminal law." <=4> 149 Wis. 2d at 360.

Although the question of whether the intercourse with Colleen was "voluntary," as the term is usually understood, [***12] is not specifically before us, it was brought out in oral argument before this court that the sexual relationship between Shane and his baby sitter, Colleen, started when he was only 12 years old and lasted over a period of several months. At no time did Shane register any complaint to his parents about the sexual liaison with Colleen.

In <=5> Schierenbeck v. Minor, 148 Colo. 582, 367 P.2d 333 (1961), Schierenbeck, a 16-year-old boy, appealed the adjudication in a dependency proceeding that he was the father of a child born to a 20-year-old woman. On appeal, Schierenbeck cited a Colorado criminal statute which defined rape in the third degree by a female of a male person under the age of 18 years. In discussing the relevance of the criminal statute, the court stated:

[*652] "Certain it is that [Schierenbeck's] his assent to the illicit act does not exclude commission of the statutory crime, but it has nothing to do with assent as relating to progeny. His youth is basic to the crime; it is not a factor in the question of whether he is the father of [the child].

"'The putative father may be liable in bastardy proceedings for the support and [***13] maintenance of his child, even though he is a minor. . . .' Bastards, 10 C.J.S. 152, @ 53. If Schierenbeck is adjudged to be the father of [the child] after a proper hearing and upon sufficient evidence, he should support [the child] under this fundamental doctrine." <=6> 148 Colo. at 586.

The trial court decision was reversed on other grounds not pertinent to the facts of our case and remanded for further proceedings.

The Kansas Parentage Act, K.S.A. 38-1110 et seq., specifically contemplates minors as fathers and makes no exception for minor parents regarding their duty to support and educate their child. K.S.A. 38-1117 provides, in part:

"If a man alleged or presumed to be the father is a minor, the court shall cause notice of the pendency of the proceedings and copies of the pleadings on file to be served upon the parents or guardian of the minor and shall appoint a guardian ad litem who shall be an attorney to represent the minor in the proceedings."

K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 38-1121(c) provides, in part:

"Upon adjudging that a party is the parent of a minor child, the court shall make provision for support and education of [***14] the child including the necessary medical expenses incident to the birth of the child. The court may order the support and education expenses to be paid by either or both parents for the minor child."

If the legislature had wanted to exclude minor parents from responsibility for support, it could easily have done so.

As previously stated, Shane does not contest that he is the biological father of the child. As a father, he has a common-law [**1278] duty, as well as a statutory duty, to support his minor child. <=7> Keller v. Guernsey, 227 Kan. 480, 486, 608 P.2d 896 (1980); <=8> Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 298, 552 P.2d 979 (1976); <=9> Grimes v. Grimes, 179 Kan. 340, 343, 295 P.2d 646 (1956). This duty applies equally to parents of children born out of wedlock. <=10> Huss v. DeMott, 215 Kan. 450, 524 P.2d 743 (1974); <=11> Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 585, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).

Under the statutory and common law of this state, Shane owes a duty to support his minor child. [***15] K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503 [*653] does not apply to a civil proceeding and cannot serve to relieve Shane of his legal responsibilities towards his child. Shane relies upon six cases to support his position: <=12> State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365, 757 P.2d 724 (1988); <=13> State v. Hutchcraft, 242 Kan. 55, 744 P.2d 849 (1987); <=14> State v. Lilley, 231 Kan. 694, 647 P.2d 1323 (1982); <=15> State v. Price, 215 Kan. 718, 529 P.2d 85 (1974); <=16> State v. Eberline, 47 Kan. 155, 27 Pac. 839 (1891); <=17> State v. Fulcher, 12 Kan. App. 2d 169, 737 P.2d 61 (1987). Each of these cases involves the age of consent issue under the Kansas statutory rape law and its present equivalent. We conclude that the issue of consent to sexual activity under the criminal statutes is irrelevant in a civil action to determine paternity and for support of the minor child of such activity. Consequently, Shane's reliance on the foregoing criminal cases is misplaced.

For Shane's [***16] next issue, he asserts that it is not sound public policy for a court to order a youth to pay child support for a child conceived during the crime of indecent liberties with a child when the victim was unable to consent to the sexual intercourse. He claims that while the Kansas Parentage Act creates a State interest in the welfare of dependent relatives, the policy behind the Parentage Act is not to force a minor, who is unable to consent to sexual intercourse, to support a child born from the criminal act.

Shane provides no case law specifically on point, but once again relies upon the Kansas cases involving statutory rape. He also refers the court to K.S.A. 39-718a, which authorized the Secretary of SRS to collect child support from an absent parent. Shane suggests that underlying K.S.A. 39-718a is the presumption that a parent consented to the conception, and argues that the proper remedy for SRS in this case is to seek support exclusively from Colleen Hermesmann, as she was the only parent legally able to consent to the conception of the child. What Shane has failed to recognize, however, is that K.S.A. 39-718a was repealed by the legislature in 1988. L. 1988, ch. 218, @ [***17] 6. Any argument based upon a statute which was repealed five years ago is obviously without merit.

However, the argument of two allegedly conflicting public policies of this state does merit consideration. Other jurisdictions have recognized the conflict between a State's interest in protecting [*654] juveniles and a State's interest in requiring parental support of children. In <=18> In re Parentage of J.S., 193 Ill. App. 3d 563, 550 N.E.2d 257 (1990), the trial court ordered a minor father to pay child support for his illegitimate son. The minor father appealed the order, but did not contest the trial court's paternity finding. In affirming the trial court's decision ordering support, the court stated:

"The respondent initially argues that he should not be required to support his child, because he was a 15-year-old minor when the child was conceived. He contends that Illinois public policy protects minors from the consequences of their improvident conduct.

"We note that contrary to the respondent's position, Illinois public policy has never offered blanket protection to reckless minors. (Citations omitted.] At the same time, Illinois public [***18] policy has recognized the blanket right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional, and monetary support of his or her parents. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2501.1.) The public has an interest in protecting children from becoming wards of the State. <=19> In re Petition of Sullivan (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 455, 480 N.E.2d 1283.

" [**1279] In the instant case, we find that the public policy mandating parental support of children overrides any policy of protecting a minor from improvident acts. We therefore hold that the trial court properly found that the respondent was financially responsible for his child." (Emphasis added.) <=20> 193 Ill. App. 3d at 565.

In <=21> Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 387 Mass. 678, 442 N.E.2d 1155 (1982), a 16-year-old father was ordered to pay child support of $ 8 a week toward the support of his child born out of wedlock. The minor father admitted his paternity, but appealed the support order. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and said:

"The defendant's claim rests on an assertion that a support [***19] order is inconsistent with the statutory purpose of treating a juvenile defendant as a child 'in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.' [Citation omitted.] Although we acknowledge that purpose, we see no basis, and certainly no statutory basis, for concluding that a juvenile should be free from any duty to support his or her illegitimate child. The illegitimate child has interests, as does the Commonwealth." <=22> 387 Mass. at 680.

This State's interest in requiring minor parents to support their children overrides the State's competing interest in protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even when such acts may include criminal activity on the part of the other parent. Considering the three persons directly involved, Shane, Colleen, and Melanie, [*655] the interests of Melanie are superior, as a matter of public policy, to those of either or both of her parents. This minor child, the only truly innocent party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of their ages.

As his third issue, Shane asserts that the district court erred in finding he and Colleen were jointly and severally liable for the child support. He argues that, [***20] as Colleen was the perpetrator of the crime of statutory rape, she alone should be held responsible for the consequences of the act, and he requests this court to remand the case to the district court with instructions to order Colleen solely responsible for the support pursuant to K.S.A. 39-718a. He states that K.S.A. 39-701 et seq. does not require a judgment ordering joint and several liability for child support.

Once again, Shane's reliance upon K.S.A. 39-718a is improper. This statute was repealed in 1988. L. 1988, ch. 218, @ 6. The controlling statute, as SRS points out, is K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 39-718b, which explicitly requires a court to order joint and several liability, with some exceptions not applicable here, when more than one person is legally obligated to support the child. SRS correctly notes that the mother's conduct has no bearing upon the parties' respective obligations to support their child. Other courts have so held. In <=23> Weinberg v. Omar E., 106 App. Div. 2d 448, 448, 482 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1984), the court held:

"The mother's alleged fault or wrongful conduct is irrelevant under section 545 of the Family [***21] Court Act [citation omitted]. The primary purpose of a paternity proceeding is to protect the welfare of the illegitimate child and, accordingly, the mother's conduct should have no bearing on the father's duty of support nor upon the manner in which the parents' respective obligations are determined [citation omitted]."

SRS also notes that Shane cites no authority in support of his contention. Nowhere does the law in this state suggest that the mother's "wrongdoing" can operate as a setoff or bar to a father's liability for child support. Under the facts as presented to this court, the district court properly held that Shane owes a duty of support to Melanie and properly ordered that Shane and Colleen were jointly and severally liable for the monies previously paid by SRS. While the foregoing disposes of the issues on appeal, we would be remiss if we did not comment upon various other facets of [*656] this appeal. This court was not supplied with any meaningful record in this case. The only record supplied by counsel was a [**1280] portion of the pleadings in the district court. No transcript or other evidence of the proceedings before the hearing officer was included in the record, and [***22] the facts, while apparently not disputed, have been gleaned from the pleadings, briefs, arguments before this court, and a transcript of the arguments before the district judge which

this court felt compelled to obtain. The appellants' brief does refer to two exhibits, allegedly attached to their brief, in support of some of their statements of fact. However, such exhibits were not made part of the record on appeal, nor were they attached as exhibits to the brief. Neither parties brief could be considered adequate, let alone a model, for appellate procedure.

Additionally, counsel for SRS joined the parents of Shane as parties defendant, although no relief was sought against those defendants. At oral argument, appellate counsel had no explanation for joining Shane's parents, but it appears trial counsel may have done so under some mistaken idea that it was necessary to obtain valid service on Shane.

Finally, we call attention to the fact that no issue was raised as to the propriety of the judgment against a youngster who was still a full-time student when these proceedings were commenced. When questioned in oral argument about the policy of SRS in seeking a judgment in excess [***23] of $ 7,000, counsel replied with the surprising statement that SRS had no intention of ever attempting to collect its judgment. Under such circumstances, the reason for seeking that portion of the judgment still eludes us.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

February 12th St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
By Nordeka English of the Post-Dispatch Staff

A former baby sitter in St. Charles County has been charged with raping a 13-year-old boy she cared for in 1992. The incident came to light late last year when the woman sued the boy for support of the baby she says resulted from the union.

The St. Charles County prosecutor has charged the woman, Regina L. Vaughan, now 20 and living in Mill Shoals, Ill., with eight counts of rape and one count of sodomy. Each count is a felony that carries a maximum penalty of life in prison.

The charge, filed Jan. 30, says the incidents took place between March 1992 and Aug. 12, 1992, three days after Vaughan turned 18. Vaughan and the boy had lived in Portage des Sioux. The boy, now 16, has moved to St. Louis County.

The boy's mother apparently learned of the sexual relationship after her son was served noticed of a paternity suit by Illinois on Vaughan's behalf. The boy's mother asked the St. Charles County Sheriff's Department to investigate.

The state filed the paternity suit after Vaughan applied to the Illinois Department of Public Aid for welfare, said a spokesman for the Sherrif's Department.

A spokeswoman for the Illinois welfare department said the state's policy is to require an applicant for public aid to name the father of a child and then seek child support from the parent before collecting welfare payments.

The state has no lower age limit when it comes to requiring child support payments from a parent.

The boy's attorney, Byron Cohen of St. Louis County, said that Illinois had withdrawn the suit, probably after finding out that the boy had been under age and legally unable to consent to having sex with Vaughan. That could not be confirmed because the suit has been sealed.

A St. Charles County judge has set Vaughan's bail at $20,000. She had not been arrested as of Friday.

I'm familiar with [this] case, and have spoken with the boy's attorney. The babysitter who raped the boy had the unmittigated gall to sue the boy for child support, after which the boy's mother asked the DA to investigate for statutory rape. The DA subsequently charged the babysitter with statutory rape, and the boy's attorney was under the impression that the BABYSITTER WITHDREW the suit seeking child support in hopes of avoiding prosecution for statutory rape. (Perhaps she withdrew her application for AFDC in hopes of avoiding rape charges.) In any event, the boy's lawyer claims that the child support suit could be resurrected at any point under Missouri law. After my discussion with the boy's attorney, I was under the impression that Missouri's laws did NOT protect boys, and that the only reason that this particular boy wasn't being sued for child support is that his rapist caused the charges to "go away" in hopes of avoiding rape charges, and indeed those charges have now been levied.

Safe word.

I had one e-mail exchange with a man who was raped in a knife point by a woman. He did not report that, and my impression was that he felt a lot of shame.

Anyway, the subject has been around from the time that the net had been flat and STella had used her full name...

If you are interested in the technique, the following two articles give a good description:

From: Carole Ashmore

Not only are there such, but Stella ******* published several of the techniques to the net during the last round of infantile 'men can rape women but women can't rape men, nayh, nayh' discussions. In increasing order of both liklihood of success and liklihood of damage to the male anatomy they were

1. Shove something of reasonable diameter up the ass --reported by the medical profession to produce 'emotionally inappropriate' erections in ~70% of the target population.
2. Constrict the base with several turns of a rubber band, allowing inflow but not outflow circulation.
3. Combine option two with pressure to the testicles.

Don't try 2 and 3 at home ladies; on the other hand #1 is a popular technique for times when he thinks he's given his all. Shall we drop the subject? ...

BULL!

Get yourself a nerfball, a spool of duct tape, a few popsicle sticks, and some smallish rubber bands....

Surprise the target in a private place and knock him down. Jam the nerfball into his mouth to prevent loud noises attracting attention, duct tape the ball in place (careful not to block his nose, mind you), tape his hands together behind his back, and remove his pants. Place the rubber bands around the base of his unit, taking the place of the one-way valves that normally prevent penile deflation. If you're in a hurry, use the popsicle sticks to hold the unit up so you don't need to wait for full inflation.

Very simple....

Ladies, if you want to use it again, be sure you remember to remove the rubber bands. On the other hand, if you're doing this as retaliation for a rape, maybe you should just superglue his hands to his butt and leave him....

Kids, don't try this at home!

STella *******

Hillel hillel@aurora.com

From: jaxom@niagara.com (Greg Sherk)
[1] Men Raped by women: Research and Discussion
Date: Fri Aug 25 10:39:22 CDT 1995

One of the earliest studies of male sexual victimization that included female offenders was Groth, Nicolas PhD and Ann Burgess RN, "Male Rape: Offenders and Victims", Am J of Psychiatry 137:7, July 1980, pp. 806-810. Groth and Burgess placed the rate of victimization at 81% male and 19% female offender. Victim age: 16 to 28. Offender age: 12 to 41. Place of study Mass. USA. (Two correctional institutes and one hospital).

Sarrel, Phillip MD and Masters, William MD, "Sexual Molestation of Men by Women", Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol 11, No 2, 1982, pp 117-131. This article looked at male response to female sexual aggression. Could the man respond sexually? What is the effect on the male? And other similar questions were discussed. This is a case study of 11 cases.

Ronald Smith, Charles J. Pine and Mark Hawley, "Social Cognitions About Adult Male Victims of Female Sexual Assault", The Journal of Sex Research, Vol 24, 1988, pp 101-112. This article is a 2x2x2 statistical analysis of what people think about male victims of female offender SA. 77 male and 89 female respondents judged a series of cases in which the gender of the victim / assailant were manipulated. Results show the male victim of female offender assaults receive the least belief and are judged to be harmed the least. These cases also received very high scores for blaming the victim.

Cindy Struckman-Johson PhD and David Struckman-Johnson PhD, "Men Pressured and Forced into Sexual Experience", Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol 23, No 1, 1994, pp 93-114. 204 college men in the midwestern USA were asked about forced sex situations occuring after age 16. 66.2% of respondants reported no coercion after age 16. 10.8% reported female initiated coercion of some form, 1% reported male coercion of some form and 6% reported some form of coercion by both males and females. Note: multiple categories possible.

3 of the female offender and 4 of the male offender (intercourse) cases used physical force. 1 female and no male used physical restraint to touch, (no intercourse). The majority of cases (male or female offender) involved some form of non physical coercion such as: bribes 9, persuasion 63, love withdrawal 10, intoxication 35.

R.T. Michael, JH Gagnon, EO Laumann and G Kolata, "Sex in America: A Definitive Survey", New York" Little Brown and Co., 1994. This book published in two editions, (public and professional) reports on the first major, random survey of sex in many years. The study was conducted by true randomization of adults in the USA. Chapter 12, Forced Sex, reports on sexual victimization as adults, (post age 13).

The reporters place sexual assault victimization, (vaginal or anal intercourse) at 22% for females and 2% for males. The offender breakdown is 98% male for female victims and 66% female for male victims.

These are of course not the only studies looking at male SA victimization. However, they and others show that SA victimization of males is mostly female offender in non-incarcerated males.

From Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will, (paperback, pg435)

Fine example of the inimitable "feminist scholarship" decried recently by feminist Barbara Dority. The statement that "the rate of false rape accusations is 2%, the same as for other crimes" is commonly asserted as established, current fact by feminist rape crisis centers and women's groups across North America. Occasionally these groups acknowledge Brownmiller as the source, but for the most part they give no clue of either the origin of the statistic or its scope, usually implying that it stands for the U.S. as a whole, or Canada as a whole, or even all of North America.

Yet on what is it based? According to Brownmiller, this datum is referenced as "'Remarks of Lawrence H. Cook, Appellate Division Justice, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,' Jan. 16, 1974 (mimeo), p. 6." One would imagine that such an oft-cited statistic would at least have passed peer review in an established social science journal. On the contrary, it is nothing more than a mimeo of some remarks made by a judge to a gathering of lawyers, regarding events in what appears to be a single precinct of New York City sometime in 1974. We have no idea what actually happened, only Brownmiller's personal interpretation. She implies that the previous rate of false accusations found by N.Y.C. police was 15%, that cited by the FBI reports. Yet in fact we don't know what that percentage was. Nor do we know the annual or precinct-by-precinct variation in the percentage. Hence we don't know how "dramatically" it dropped, or whether any drop was statistically significant. Even if there was a drop, there's no reason to conclude that it had anything to do with the gender of the investigators. A more mundane explanation might be the increased zealousness to clear a case that one would expect of a special investigatory unit in a politically charged situation, where their recommendations are likely to be public record.

In providing a statistic of false rape accusations, Brownmiller had two choices. She could have sided with the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI (15-20%), the agency probably more experienced in law enforcement than any other federal agency, or the mimeographed comments of an appellate judge (2%), who probably had no law enforcement experience and saw only those cases that made it to court. Faced with this choice, she sides with what amounts to nothing more than a second-hand anecdote. It's clear what she wanted to believe; if the figures were reversed, is there any doubt that the mimeo never would have seen the light of day? How many contradictory mimeos did Brownmiller pass over?

There still is no published data that contradicts the FBI figure of 15%. I've done a computer search of over 1500 social science journals from January 1974 to April 1991, and found no paper that explicitly attempts to measure the false accusation rate in the U.S. or Canada. The only figures we have to go on appear to be the Uniform Crime Reports or the raw data/guidelines from local offices. The UCRs show that only about 50% of all rape accusations are cleared by enforcement agencies. Since the majority of rapes are committed by acquaintances of the victim, this figure is by no means inconsistent with a 15% rate of false accusations. Obviously this rate will be extremely difficult to quantify accurately, especially in a way that gives a reasonable estimate of a national average, and I'm not surprised that nobody has attempted it. My only point is that the 2% figure has virtually no substance, and what little published evidence there is points to a considerably larger figure.

INTRODUCTION

[the author discusses the history of unfounded rape allegations, and how legitimate cases of rape were discounted until pressure from women's groups caused them to be taken more seriously. However, the pendulum has now swung the other way]

Currently, the two main identifiable adversaries involved in the false rape allegations controversy are the feminists and the police. The feminists are by far the most expressive and prominent on this issue. Some feminists take the position that the declaration of rape as false or unfounded largely means that the police do not believe the complainant; that is, the rape charges are real reflections of criminal assault, but the agents of the criminal justice system do not believe them (Brownmiller, 1975; Russell, 1984). Some feminists virtually deny the existence of false rape accusations and believe the concept itself constitutes discriminatory harassment toward women (see Grano, 1990). On the other hand, police are prone to say the reason for not believing some rape complainants resides in the fact that the rapes never occurred (Payton, 1967; Wilson, 1978; Jay, 1991). Medical Examiners lend support to this police position by emphasizing the ever-present possibility that rape complainants may be lying (Shill, 1969, 1971).

METHODS

[I've included these in full, since they're obviously crucial]

This investigation is essentially a case study of one police agency in a small metropolitan area (population = 70,000) in the Midwestern United States. This city was targeted for study because it offered an almost model laboratory for studying false rape allegations. First, its police agency is not inundated with serious felony cases and, therefore, has the freedom and the motivation to record and thoroughly pursue all rape complaints. In fact, agency policy forbids police officers to use their discretion in deciding whether to officially acknowledge a rape complaint, regardless how suspect that complaint may be. Second, the declaration of a false allegation follows a highly institutionalized procedure. The investigation of all rape complaints always involves a serious offer to polygraph the complainants and the suspects. Additionally, for a declaration of false charge to be made, the complainant must admit that no rape had occurred. She is the sole agent who can say that the rape charge is false. The police department will not declare a rape charge as false when the complainant, for whatever reason, fails to pursue the charge or cooperate on the case, regardless how much doubt the police may have regarding the validity of the charge.

In short, these cases are declared false only because the complainant admitted they are false. Furthermore, only one person is then empowered to enter into the records a formal declaration that the charge is false, the officer in charge of records. Last, it should be noted that this department does not confuse reported rape attempts with completed rapes. Thus, the rape complainants referred to in this paper are for completed forcible rapes only. The foregoing leaves us with a certain confidence that cases declared false by this police agency are indeed a reasonable- if not a minimal reflection of false rape allegations made to this agency, especially when one considers that a finding of false allegation is totally dependent upon the recantation of the rape charge.

We followed and investigated all false rape allegations from 1978 to 1987. A ranking police official notified us whenever a rape charge was declared false and provided us with the records of the case. In addition, the investigating officers provided any requested supplementary information so that we could be confident of the validity of the false rape allegation declarations.

FINDINGS

[The author notes that previous estimates of false rape reporting vary pretty much from 0 to 100% and probably reflect bias.]

Regarding this study, 41% (n= 45) of the total disposed rape cases (n= 109) were officially declared false during this 9-year period, that is, by the complainant's admission that no rape had occurred and the charge, therefore, was false. The incidence figure was variable from year to year and ranged from a low of 27% (3 out of Il cases) to a high of 70% (7 out of 10 cases). The 9-year period suggests no trends, and no explanation has been made for the year-to-year fluctuation.

[Author says recanted and unrecanted reports were from people indistinguishable by background]

The study of these 45 cases of false rape allegations inexorably led to the conclusion that these false charges were able to serve three major functions for the complainants: providing an alibi, a means of gaining revenge, and a platform for seeking attention/sympathy. This tripartite model resulted from the complainants' own verbalizations during recantation and does not constitute conjecture. Of course, we are not asserting that these functions are mutually exclusive or exhaustive; rather, these rape recantations focused on a single factor explanation. A possible objection to these recantations concerns their validity. Rape recantations could be the result of the complainants' desire to avoid a "second assault" at the hands of the police. Rather than proceed with the real charge of rape, the argument goes, these women withdrew their accusations to avoid the trauma of police investigation.

Several responses are possible to this type of criticism. First, with very few exceptions, these complainants were suspect at the time of the complaint or within a day or two after charging. These recantations did not follow prolonged periods of investigation and interrogation that would constitute anything approximating a second assault. Second, not one of the detectives believed that an incident of false recantation had occurred. They argued, rather convincingly, that in those cases where a suspect was identified and interrogated, the facts of the recantation dovetailed with the suspect's own defense. Last, the policy of this police agency is to apply a statute regarding the false reporting of a felony. After the recant, the complainant is informed that she will be charged with filing a false complaint, punishable by a substantial fine and a jail sentence. In no case, has an effort been made on the part of the complainant to retract the recantation. Although we certainly do not deny the possibility of false recantations, no evidence supports such an interpretation for these cases.

[there follows a long discussion of motivation for false reports]

RELATED FINDINGS

[this I found fascinating]

In addition to the foregoing, certain other findings and observations relevant to false allegations warrant comment. First, false allegations failed to include accusations of forced sexual acts other than penile-vaginal intercourse. Not one complainant mentions forced oral or anal sex. In contrast, these acts were included in approximately 25% of the rounded forcible rape complaints. Perhaps it was simply psychologically and socially more prudent for these women to minimize the humiliation of sexual victimization by not embroidering the event any more than necessary. This phenomenon has been observed previously (McDowell and Hibler, 1987).

[author notes that extortion was never found to be a motive. And now the important bit, IMHO]

One of the most haunting and serious implications of false rape allegations concerns the possibility of miscarried justice. We know that false convictions occur, but this study only tells us that these false accusers were weeded out during the very early stages of investigation. However encouraging this result may be, we cannot claim that false charging does not incur suffering for the accused. Merely to be a rape suspect, even for a day or two, translates into psychological and social trauma.

CONCLUSIONS

[a long discussion of how police procedures affect the reported incidence of false rape reporting. And the final summary...]

We may well be faced with the fact that the most efficient police departments report the higher incidence of false rape allegations. In view of these factors, perhaps the most prudent summary statement that is appropriate from these data is that false rape accusations are not uncommon. Since this effort is the first at a systematic, long-term, on-site investigation of false rape allegations from a single city, future studies in other cities, with comparable policies, must assess the representativeness of these findings.

ADDENDA

[Other studies on college campuses have come up with a figure of about 50% for false rape reports]

Quite unexpectedly then, we find that these university women, when filing a rape complaint, were as likely to file a false as a valid charge. Other reports from university police agencies support these findings (Jay, 1991). In both police agencies, the taking of the complaint and the follow-up investigation was the exclusive responsibility of a ranking female officer. Neither agency employed the polygraph and neither declared the complaint false without a recantation of the charge.

[There are obviously a few caveats, addenda and quid pro quos here. Nonetheless, I think those who question the need for thorough cross-examination of alleged rape victims should consider the fact that statistically, this study suggest that there is about a 50% chance they're lying.]

Derek Rose posted

At Vassar College, where I used to go to school, I knew of more than one case where a woman said "no"--weeks or even months after a sexual encounter. The New York Times reported last month (June 1, 1994, p. B-22) of a case at Pomona College where a student is in risk of being denied his diploma because a woman came forward 2 years after an incident and says it was rape--not because she said no, or any force was used, but because she didn't explicitly consent. Even in the real world, FBI statistics show that the police deem about 8% of rape allegations reported to the police "unfounded" because the woman either recanted or the police found absolutely no evidence supporting her allegations. (The Washington Post did a very good article on this about 2 years ago; I can try and dig it up if you'd like).

The truth is, in this politically correct society, I'm not sure if you can ever be "in the clear." I heard on the radio a few weeks ago some semi-celebrity, I forget which, who tried to tape-record a sexual encounter because he was scared of getting accused of date-rape, and was charged with an invasion of privacy instead. You can never be safe. I recommend total abstinence, and only leaving home on a few select occasions, surrounded by friends and neutral witnesses.

Derek Rose responds:

Also, I should note that Linda Fairstein, the former director of Manhattan's Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit, devotes an entire chapter of her recent book Sexual Violence to the un-p.c. subject of false accusations motivated by attention seeking and revenge.

After all, the Movies have Oscar, Television has Emmy, Music has Grammy , why not a special recognition for those who fuel the flames of feminist hatred with false tales of Rape (providing ammunition for the likes of Neal King & Martha McCaughey & Cheri Gurse to espouse the official teachings of The University of California "Rape represents normal male sexuality, the abuse of women for fun")

All Nominations for this award should be Carefully Documented!!! This is not about denying the crime of rape (It does happen, to both men and women), This is about Publicly Acknowledging the Crime of False Accusation of Rape , which is rarely if ever punished. And thus for our First Ever Recipient, who could be more deserving than:

Lt Warnick, a voluntary participant in such tailhook activities as "Leg Shaving" (where womyn had an elaborate 30 - 45 minute shave with hot towels, baby lotion etc by one or more males) and "Belly Shots" (where womyn poured liquor in their belly buttons for others to drink), as well as consensual sex with other male attendees, decided to charge three officers with "Gang Rape" in order to protect hyr own reputation from hyr fiance.

(From interview with Cdr. Robert B.Rae U.S.N. Defense attorney, Heterodoxy 4/94)

And so it goes, Our Salute to 'Beth' for the courage of hyr feminist convictions, trying to send three innocent men to prison to protect hyr reputation, a performance worthy of the not so coveted "NORMA" award.

McD

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) are less than reliable. Grand Rapids, MI has been known as the 'rape capital' of the US for last four years.

However, a reporter has shown that this was due to the Grand Rapids police reporting 'criminal sexual assault' and to the FBI counting all such crimes as rapes. This inadvertently counted many crimes which, while horrible, do not fit the FBI definition of Rape.

Part of the discrepancy was that the Grand Rapid stats included sexual assault of males, while the FBI description of rape is forced "carnal knowledge of a female."